



Displaced Syrians in Lebanon

Case Study

June 2019

Presented to His Beatitude the Patriarch Cardinal Mar Bechara Boutros al-Rahi

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
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Acronyms and Abbreviations

BDL	Banque Du Liban	MoL	Ministry of Labor
CAGR	Compounded Annual Growth Rate	MoSA	Ministry of Social Affairs
CAS	Central Administration of Statistics	NGO	Non-governmental Organization
DSL	Displaced Syrians in Lebanon	PHC	Primary Health Care
EDL	Electricité du Liban	PHCC	Primary Health Care Center
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization	RACE I	Reaching All Children with Education I
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment	RACE II	Reaching All Children with Education II
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	RRP	Regional Response Plan
GoL	Government of Lebanon	SMEB	Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket
GSO	General Security Office	UN	United Nations
ILO	International Labor Organization	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
IMF	International Monetary Fund	UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
LCRP	Lebanon Crisis Response Plan	UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
MEB	Minimum Expenditure Basket	UNRC/ HC	UN Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinator
MEHE	Ministry of Education and Higher Education	WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
MoEW	Ministry of Energy and Water	WFP	World Food Programme
MoIM	Ministry of Interior and Municipalities		

Executive Summary



2.1M

(1.6M DSL + 500,000 migrant workers living in Lebanon before 2011)

Actual Syrian population in Lebanon

- 56% of the DSL are below 18 years old
- DSL household size: 4.9 (vs. 4 for Lebanese residents)
- 70% of the DSL live below the poverty line (less than US\$ 4 per day)
- 73% of the DSL do not hold a legal residency

79%

of the DSL births did not fully complete the registration process, leaving nearly 230 thousand DSL stateless



- 3% of the DSL new-borns are paperless



48%

(US\$ 6.9Bn received vs. US\$ 13.6Bn required)

Average funding gap (2013-2018)

- In 2018, the Jordanian Government received \$1.13 for each dollar delivered to the displaced Syrians vs. \$0.13 for Lebanon
- The funds received from the international community barely cover the basic needs (mainly food security and education) of less than 700K registered DSL (out of 950K), leaving Lebanon bearing the burden of 2.1Mn Syrians across all sectors.
- Average yearly received funds (2013-2018) per registered DSL capita US\$ 1,143
- The Syrian crisis has lowered Lebanon's average GDP growth rate by 2.9% per year, with a cumulative impact of US\$ 18.1 billion between 2011 and 2015



486 MW (25% of the national production) needed to cope for DSL demand

- 45% of the DSL households are illegally connected to the power network
- Energy is a vital cross-sectorial element, but only 1% of the needed funds are met
- Yearly estimated impact of US\$ 333 Mn

36% of the school-aged DSL are enrolled in the education system



- Half of the public schools' students are Syrians
- Number of teachers increased by 13,000 for an additional yearly cost of US\$ 25 million
- 66% of public schools need renovation due to damaged equipment and a shortage in water and sanitation structures
- Yearly estimated impact of US\$ 350Mn

of the DSL have the intention to go back to their homeland. **89%**

- 86% of the DSL do not intend to return in the near future (for security reasons – including fear of the military service - lack of shelter and lack of livelihoods opportunities)



The DSL influx increased
the labor force by **30%**
(nearly 400 thousand additional workers)



- As of 2018, only 2,000 Syrian workers are registered with the Ministry of Labor
- 220,000 Lebanese lost their jobs as a result of the additional workforce since 2011
- 170,000 additional Lebanese living below the poverty line since 2011 (adding to the existing 1 million)
- Unemployment among the Lebanese youth soon to reach 40%

INCREASED STRESS ON ALREADY DEPLETING WATER SOURCES

(demand rose by 52 million cubic meters per year)



- Average daily water consumption per DSL capita: 64 to 104 liters (vs. 140 liters for Lebanese residents)
- Faster deterioration of water quality leading to the introduction of new diseases
- Only 8% of the consumed water by the Lebanese residents and the DSL is treated
- Yearly estimated impact of US\$ 586 Mn

The crisis increased the demand
for public health services by: **40%**

- 1,219 Primary Healthcare facilities and 50 hospitals are available to all DSL, whether registered or not with UNHCR
- 82,894 referrals were financially supported by UNHCR in 2017 (60% of which were pregnancy-related) for an amount of US\$ 53 million
- Yearly estimated impact of US\$ 70 million



1. Introduction

1.1 General Overview

What started as pacific protests in March 2011, ended by being the largest displacement crisis for the past forty years. According to the IMF, 13 million Syrians (more than half of the population) had to leave their homes and more than 5 million were forced out of the country.

At the start of the conflict, Lebanon was facing months of delay in the formation of its government, two years without a president, and was not prepared at all for this identity-threatening challenge. Against all odds however, the Government of Lebanon (GoL), with the help of the International Community, managed to put in place a Regional Response Plan (RRP5 and RRP6), followed by the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) aiming at monitoring, evaluating, and mitigating the crisis impact on Lebanon, while supporting the most vulnerable (whether Lebanese or Syrians).

Even though the UN and the international community considers the Syrians fleeing the conflict as “refugees”, the Government of Lebanon refers to the individuals who have crossed the Lebanese–Syrian borders since March 2011 as temporarily “displaced”.

Bounded by Syria from the north and the east, Lebanon had to host almost 30% of the Displaced Syrians (DSL). After the presence of at least 175 thousand Palestinians¹, it was a highly delicate and controversial matter at all political, social, and economic levels, to accept the fact that the country had to embrace 1.6 million displaced Syrians across 1,500

¹ <http://www.businessnews.com.lb/cms/Story/StoryDetails.aspx?ItemID=6343> – There are many estimations: 175,000 as per the latest census done in 2018 by the Lebanese Palestinian dialogue Committee/ 200,000 according to the Central Administration of Statistics (1997)/ 270,000 according to the American University of Beirut(2010-2015)/ 459,000 registered in UNRWA(2016)/ 593,000 registered in the Ministry of Interior(2016)

municipalities, out of which only 948,849 were registered with the UNHCR² (comparatively, Jordan hosts 1.4 million displaced Syrians³, out of which only 660 thousand registered with the UNHCR⁴). During our research and interviews however, our sources revealed that the actual number of Syrians in Lebanon is as high as 2.1Mn, which represents ~50% of the Lebanese population. To give an order of magnitude, it is as if the USA had suddenly 160 million refugees in their mainland.

The crisis has had a significant and direct impact on Lebanon; if no action is taken soon, it will remold its demographic equilibrium, socio-economic status, political and security environment.

Prior to the crisis, Lebanon already had development constraints and a fragile governance system, but the country is being further destabilized by the presence of the DSL and, according to the World Bank estimate, already lost around US\$ 18.1 billion between 2011 and 2015 (most significant impacts being bared by the health, education, water and energy sectors).

The Lebanese economy is swamped with one of the highest debt-to-GDP ratios in the world (which increased from 130% in 2011 to 151%⁵ in 2018); Lebanon's debt-to-GDP could reach 180%⁶ in 2023. Syrian influx is a major component of the Lebanese socioeconomic decline, reducing its yearly GDP growth rate from an average of 9% between 2007 and 2010, to an

²As of December 2018 <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/71>

³ Jordan Response Plan for the Syria crisis

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/JRP16_18_Document-final+draft.pdf

⁴ As of April 2019 <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/36>

⁵ World Bank forecast <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lebanon/overview>

⁶ Lebanon: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2018 Article IV Mission

<https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/02/12/ms021218-lebanon-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2018-article-iv-mission>

average rate of less than 2%⁷ since the outburst of the Syrian crisis; however, political conflicts and regional instabilities played a very important role as well.

Lebanon's unemployment rate among the young generation is alarmingly high (37%), with a national average of 25%⁸. Unemployment forecasts are not reassuring, with no foreseen deep labor and structural reforms, aggravated by the vocational trainings given to the DSL by some NGOs. The displaced Syrians already underprice Lebanese by the labor rate.

Through these vocational training they are rendered even more competitive vis-a-vis their Lebanese counterparts. The national poverty line has reached nearly 30% of the Lebanese population⁹ out of which 10% are in extreme poverty.

With no political solution in sight, the DSL will remain for an undefined period in Lebanon. Despite the efforts from 2011 till today, donor organizations, governments and all involved agencies were falling short of meeting the call to fund the needs of DSL. Insufficient funding or mismanaged budget threatens the wellbeing of both the Lebanese and the displaced Syrians.

Based on compiled information from different sources, field surveys and one-on-one interviews with national decisions makers and key stakeholders (UNHCR, HRW, ALEF, Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Labor, senior officers within the Security Forces) we will showcase the direct impact of the Syrian Crisis on Lebanon, highlighting the current situation and providing recommendations to mitigate this burden.

⁷ <https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/lebanon/real-gdp-growth>


⁸ Lebanon Humanitarian Fund Annual Report 2018

<https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Lebanon%20HF%20Annual%20Report%202018.pdf>

⁹ Lebanon Humanitarian Fund Annual Report 2018

<https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/Lebanon%20HF%20Annual%20Report%202018.pdf>

1.2 Crisis Chronology



February-April 2011: Beginning of demonstrations for political reforms and the end of 48 years of state of emergency. The Syrian regime answered by violent repressions, which in turn engendered a progressive militarization of the anti-regime parties.

December 2011: First flow of hundreds of DSL coming from Tal Kalakh and Homs. Most DSL reported staying with host families or relatives. The total number of DSL reached around 5,000. Although there are no labor statistics in Lebanon, an official statement confirmed that over 500,000 Syrian were working in the construction and agriculture sectors in Lebanon prior the Syrian conflict¹⁰.

December 2012, according to the UNHCR, registrations reached 3,000 per week, with thousands of DSL and Palestinians escaping to Lebanon from Yarmouk camp. By the end of the year 2012, 175,042¹¹ DSL were registered.

April 2013, 356,000 DSL have registered with UNHCR in Lebanon. The government of Lebanon estimates that the total number of DSL between registered and unregistered reached 1 million¹². Lebanon did not possess any resources close to adequate to address this kind of crisis.

October 2013, at this stage only the vulnerable were assisted by the UNHCR through “targeted assistance”. From New York, President Michel Sleiman and UN Secretary-

¹⁰ <https://www.elnashra.com/news/show/959388>

¹¹ UNHCR – 2012 Global Report

¹² <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2014/4/533c15179/syrian-DSL-lebanon-surpass-million.html>

General Ban Ki-moon launched the International Support Group for Lebanon¹³, aiming at helping Lebanon cope with the influx of DSL.

November 2013, Thousands of DSL stream into the town of Aarsal in a matter of days amid clashes in Qalamoun. By the end of 2013, the number of registered DSL has been multiplied by 5 compared to 2012, reaching 860,000¹⁴ - the highest number in the region.

- **Registered DSL by date | 01 July 2013 = 492,244¹⁵**
- **Registered DSL by end of 2013 = 862,526**
- **Required Fund | US\$ 1.7 Billion Including GoL requirement**

April 2014, the total number of registered DSL reaches 1,000,000. Lebanon hosts the highest number of displaced persons per capita in the world, with DSL comprising at least 25% of the resident population. A new displaced Syrian is registered by UNHCR each minute as donor countries fail to live up to their financial pledges.

May 2014, the Lebanese General Security implements new entry requirements for Palestinian Syrians. According to Human Rights Watch, the Lebanese Government forcibly returned dozens of Palestinians to Syria.

October 2014, the Minister of Social Affairs announced that only Syrians with exigent humanitarian needs will be granted temporary asylum in Lebanon. The total number of registered DSL reaches more than 1,100,000.

¹³ <https://unsc.org/unmissions.org/documents-international-support-group-lebanon-0?page=4>

¹⁴ UNHCR – 2013 Global Report

¹⁵ <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/71>

December 2014, the Lebanese Government and the UN launched a US\$ 2.14 billion response plan (LCRP) to finance the needs of DSL throughout 2015.

- **Registered DSL by date | 02 January 2014 = 807,940**
- **Registered DSL by date | 03 June 2014 = 1,070,802**
- **Registered DSL by the end of 2014 = 1,167,179**
- **Required Fund | US\$ 1.9 Billion Including GoL requirement**

January 2015, Lebanon adopts a new visa policy for Syrians.

May 2015, the Lebanese Government suspended the UNHCR from registering additional DSL¹⁶, which made it harder for the government and the UN agencies to keep track of the newcomers.

October 2015, A joint UNDP and UNHCR report¹⁷ revealed that DSL may accept wages as much as 50 to 65% lower than the Lebanese nationals, increasing the risk of unemployment among limited skills population and directly affecting manual workers (plumbers, electricians, bakers and others)

- **Registered DSL by date | 02 January 2015 = 1,146,911**
- **Registered DSL by date | 06 July 2015 = 1,172,753**
- **Registered DSL by date | 31 December 2015 = 1,069,111**
- **Required Fund | US\$ 2.14 Billion Including GoL requirement**

¹⁶ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/14/lebanon-new-refugee-policy-step-forward>

¹⁷ <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/44374>

February 2016, at the London Conference, the World Bank estimated that Lebanon has suffered \$13.1 billion of losses since 2012 (more than 11% of its GDP) - out of which \$5.6 billion in 2015 alone. Acknowledging the extended duration and nature of the crisis, the Lebanese Government, backed by the Conference's sponsors, presented a holistic approach consisting of a five year program on (1) education (RACE I and II), and (2) economic opportunities diminishing the needs for humanitarian assistance and creating up to 350,000 jobs, 60% of which for Syrians¹⁸.

- **Registered DSL by date | 30 June 2016 = 1,033,513**
- **Registered DSL by date | 31 December 2016 = 1,011,366**
- **Required Fund | US\$ 2.48 Billion Including GoL requirement**

February 2017, the GSO (General Security Office) published an announcement stating that DSL registered with UNHCR before January 1, 2015 are granted six months free of charge residency permit, renewable several times and not subject to late fees.

July-November 2017, the Lebanese government estimated that 55,000 to 90,000 DSL have returned to their homeland, but no accurate data was found.

- **Registered DSL by date | 30 June 2017 = 1,001,051**
- **Registered DSL by date | 31 December 2017 = 997,552**
- **Required Fund | US\$ 2.75 Billion Including GoL requirement**

December 2018, despite the steadily rising needs, the 2018 funding gap for UNHCR in Lebanon is at 58% (following a peak at 61% in 2017). With the anticipation of further

¹⁸ <http://www.businessnews.com.lb/download/LondonConferenceLebanonStatementOfIntent4Feb2016.pdf>

cuts to the aid programs, poverty rate among both Syrians and Lebanese will increase and the most vulnerable will be prone to more violence.

- **Registered DSL by date | 30 June 2018 = 976,065**
- **Registered DSL by date | 30 November 2018 = 950,334**
- **Registered DSL by date | 31 December 2018 = 948,849**
- **Required Fund | US\$ 2.68 Billion Including GoL requirement**

1.3 Significance and Objectives

Every actor involved in the displaced Syrians crisis has contributed to its literature in one way or another.

Some have done field surveys, others descriptive statistics while some INGOs have attempted to map the DSL' presence on the Lebanese Territory or their access to infrastructure or other facilities. No one, however, has correlated the increased Syrian presence and the fragile societal and economic equilibrium in Lebanon.

This study aimed therefore to pinpoint the main conclusions of the previous studies and surveys along with their most important limitations or weaknesses. Most importantly, the current research paper shed lights on the impact of the Syrian Crisis in general and the DSL in particular on Lebanon, its society and its economy. The primary objectives of this paper could be summarized by:

- Studying the impact of the DSL on the Lebanese society, economy and infrastructure
- Recommending measures to mitigate risks on the affected sectors
- Identifying what would motivate the DSL to return to their home country

To achieve these objectives, a literature review was first performed. Next, qualitative and quantitative primary research was done. It covered key actors involved in the DSL issue and a field survey performed by the UNHCR.

1.4 Limitations

Lebanon's post-crisis development constraints made it difficult to collect actual accurate statistics. The country was neither ready to track nor to study the impact of the massive presence of DSL. Thus, it is crucial to mention that documentations from both the Lebanese public authorities and international agencies were not systematically error-free.

The willingness to respond to the evaluation instruments or to some interviews were affected in a few cases by the sensitivity of information or by a "no info sharing" philosophy. Few institutions that had to be accessed, were not very cooperative and acted with defensiveness.

In some instances, however, personal connections ensured access to valuable data. Confidentiality measures were fully respected. This data, uncovered by reliable sources, highlighted the tremendous danger that Lebanon is facing due to the DSL issue.

On a parallel note, all registered DSL numbers are updated on a monthly basis while funds and budgets are remodeled upon new injections when necessary. Therefore, registration numbers and budgets change constantly. In addition, the large number of unregistered DSL made it hard to quantify and qualify the exact security and safety measures that should be taken to protect both Lebanon and the DSL.

Finally, discrepancies between the various sources consulted made it difficult to identify 100% correct data.

1.5 Key Actors in the Response Plan

The MoSA (Ministry of Social Affairs) is mandated by the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Displaced to lead and oversee the Government’s response to the crisis in Lebanon.

MoSA’s leadership is shared with the UN Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinator (UN RC/ HC).

Both MoSA and UN RC/ HC superintend the Inter-Sector working group which include technical Government ministries and key response partners from the UN, donors and NGOs.

The Inter-Sector working group is co-chaired by UNHCR and UNDP.




Figure 1. LCRP leadership. Source: LCRP 2017-2020

2. Situation Analysis

2.1 Published Data

The Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) is a joint plan between the Government of Lebanon and the United Nations. Created in 2015 and yearly updated, the LCRP is the successor of the RRP5 and 6 (Regional Response Plan) and was developed to ensure a proper human response to the crisis. It plays a stabilizing role by supporting the key sectors hindered by the crisis (labor, energy, education, health...) and is the main channel by which international aid is delivered and monitored.

Involving more than 130 partners in 2018 (local and international NGOs), the LCRP aims at (1) providing humanitarian assistance to 1 million vulnerable Lebanese and 1.6 million displaced Syrians, (2) delivering basic services through existing national systems and (3) strengthening Lebanon's socio-economic, environmental and institutional stability.

The LCRP implementation showed concrete results on the ground. However, having barely received 50% of the required funds since 2013, the objectives couldn't be fully achieved, and the aid distribution is being prioritized.

The Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR) report is a document produced by the UNHCR, UNICEF and World Food Programme (WFP). Started in 2013 and yearly updated, VASyR sheds light upon the DSL situation in terms of demographics, protection, shelter, WASH (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene), education, health, food consumption & security, economic vulnerability, livelihoods & income, coping strategies and received assistance.

The VASyR report is used to evaluate DSL needs and update the LCRP accordingly. The evaluation is based on surveys performed over a sample of approximately four thousand randomly selected households across the 26 Lebanese districts.

Although VASyR provides a comprehensive outlook of the DSL situation, it doesn't cater for the vulnerable Lebanese population, thus showing only one aspect of the crisis.

Knowledge, Attitude and Practice (KAP) is a cross-sectorial formative research conducted in 2017 by researchers from the Malmö university in Sweden, on behalf of the UNICEF. Its aim is to establish a baseline for the 2017-2020 UNICEF Lebanon's Country Programme by providing recommendations regarding education, child protection, inclusion, rights and survival.

KAP distinguishes itself by the sampling size (7 thousand households) and the inclusion of Lebanese residents. KAP is however limited to UNICEF activities, and similar studies encompassing all impacted sectors should be conducted as well.

2.2 Sectors and Funds

Since 2013, a total of US\$ 6.4 Bn has been received in support of the crisis response.

Although not meeting expectations (US\$ 13.6 Bn required funds since 2013), the received assistance has brought vital cross-sectorial support to Lebanon, preventing further deterioration of the situation. However, the gap between required and received funds has alarmingly increased from 39% in 2013 to 58% in 2018.

While Jordan is facing the same funding gap issue, the country received 22% higher funds per registered displaced Syrian in 2018 (\$1,445 vs. \$1,188 for Lebanon).

Received funds per registered displaced Syrian (US\$) (2018)




Figure 2. Received funds per registered displaced Syrian

During the same period, GoL only received 11% of the delivered funds, compared to 53% for the Jordanian Government¹⁹ which received US\$ 507 million for budget support, out of the US\$ 954 million delivered. In other words, the Jordanian Government received \$1.13 for each dollar delivered to the displaced Syrians vs. \$0.13 for GoL.

Funds received by the Government for each US\$ delivered to the displaced Syrians (US\$) (2018)




Figure 3. Funds received by the Government for each US\$ delivered to the displaced Syrians

¹⁹ <http://www.jordantimes.com/news/local/only-38-aid-required-jordan-response-plan-received-year>

Required Funds Vs. Received (US\$ Billions) (2013-2018)




Figure 4. Required funds vs. received. Source: UNOCHA Financial Tracking service

Required Funds (US\$ Billions) (2013-2018)




Figure 5. Required funds breakdown. Source: UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service




Figure 6. Received funds breakdown. Source: UNOCHA Financial Tracking service




Figure 7. Split of required funds vs. received by entity. Source: UNOCHA Financial Tracking service

In 2018, received funds per registered DSL capita amounted to US\$ 1,188 (over the year) or US\$ 5,821 per DSL household.




Figure 8. Received funds per registered DSL capita

Below are the 10 sectors (and their role) where the international aid is currently implemented:

1. Basic Assistance (supporting the most vulnerable households in meeting their basic survival needs)
2. Education (enhancing education access, quality, environment and governance)
3. Energy (increasing energy production while decreasing demand, and improving access to electricity)
4. Food Security & Agriculture (improving food access, availability and utilization)
5. Health (improving access to PHCCs and hospitals, better infectious disease control)
6. Livelihoods (stimulating local economic development, improving workforce employability, enabling environment for job creations)
7. Protection (ensuring DSL access to their basic rights, abuse and violence protection)
8. Shelter (reducing shelter needs of the most vulnerable households, upgrading of disadvantaged areas)

9. Social Stability (strengthening municipalities, national and local institutions capacities to foster dialogue and monitor tensions)

10. Water (enabling access to drinking water and safely treated wastewater)

Because of the received funds scarcity, a prioritization process had to be put in place, meaning that not all the sectors are equally treated. This is particularly the case of the energy sector where only 1% of its needs were met in 2018 (representing 0.1% of total received funds), whereas electricity is a vital cross-sectorial element for: conveying water (water pumps), schools, hospitals, livelihoods and basic assistance (power generators bills are more expensive).




Figure 9. Received funds by sector. Source: UNORCHA Financial Tracking service




Figure 10. Share of received funds vs. required by sector. Source: UNORCHA Financial Tracking service

3. Syrian Crisis Impact

3.1 Insights and comments on the total number of Syrians

Although acknowledging the presence of 1.6Mn DSL, the UNHCR and HRW did not concur with our estimations of 2.1Mn Syrians²⁰ (DSL + pre-crisis existing population), while some of the Lebanese officials did not confirm or infirm our figures. According to them, the 500 thousand migrant Syrian workers present in Lebanon before 2011 are already counted within the 1.6Mn DSL population.

We have reasonable reasons to affirm that our estimations are closer to the reality:

- a) According to an ILO report published in 2015²¹, only 160 thousand DSL were employed in 2014 (out of 1.1Mn registered), which is far from the pre-crisis migrant Syrian workers population.

²⁰ Our figures are also corroborated by other press articles such as <https://libnanews.com/liban-2285-millions-refugies-syriens-palestiniens/> and <https://www.lorientlejour.com/article/1173444/liban-des-milliers-denfants-syriens-menaces-par-un-plan-de-demolition.html>

²¹ Towards Decent Work in Lebanon: Issues and Challenges in Light of the Syrian Refugee Crisis

- b) Moreover, the same ILO report states that out of these 160 thousand workers, a mere 19 thousand were employed in the construction field. Knowing that during 2014 the real-estate sector in Lebanon was not facing any recession yet to justify such a low number, and taking into consideration that a majority of the pre-crisis migrant Syrian workers were in the construction (and agricultural) sector, we can fairly assume that the DSL population does not comprise the latter.
- c) Finally, a World Bank report footnote²² about the number of DSL states the following: “Not all Syrians entering Lebanon register as refugees even if they are eligible to do so. This may be because of self-sufficiency, inability to access registration centers, the time/costs involved, or to retain anonymity. An estimate of this population has been included in the overall calculation. It does not include the sizeable population of Syrian migrants thought to be in the country prior to the onset of the conflict in March 2011”.

Number of Syrians in Lebanon - Assumptions

- (a) Number of registered DSL: 948,849
- (b) Number of unregistered DSL: ~550,000
- (c) Total number of DSL: 1.5Mn (a+b)
- (d) **The above number has been officially stable since end 2014**
- (e) Birth rate* = 21 per mil / Mortality rate* = 5 per mil -> net yearly growth = 16 per mil (1.6%)
- (f) Net DSL population growth between 2014 and 2019 = $1,500,000 \times 1.016^5 = 124,000$
- (g) The number of Syrian migrant workers living in Lebanon before 2011 is ~500,000

Results

$$(c)+(e)+(f) = 1,500,000+124,000+500,000 = \mathbf{2,124,000}$$

**According to the World Bank's 2017 estimations (<https://data.worldbank.org>)*

²² Lebanon: Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict (Footnote number 6)

3.2 Security Risks and Threats

With seven official border crossing points, the Lebanese-Syrian border runs for a total length of about 375 kilometers, and accounts for most of Lebanon’s land border. Historically porous, governance mechanisms in the border areas between Lebanon and Syria revealed to be major elements of stability or volatility since the Syrian turmoil.

The cumulative net number of incoming and outgoing Syrians having officially crossed the border between 2014 and 2018 is very shy (+384 thousands) when compared to the real figure of 1.6 million DSL, who have added to the existing 500 thousand migrant Syrian workers living in Lebanon before 2011.




Figure 11. Syrians flow at the Lebanese borders. Source: General Security

Many areas on the Lebanese side of the border witnessed a deeper marginalization, due to the inadequate Lebanese Government's answer to the Syrian crisis (and that of international agencies): First, development projects are inexistent, and second, these areas became heavily dependent to foreign aid.

Between 2011 and 2013, the border areas witnessed heavy movements on both Lebanese and Syrian sides: from Syria into Lebanon, where a continuous flow of Syrians fleeing the conflict moved to and settled in Lebanon, and from Lebanon into Syria, where paramilitary forces were deployed to backup either the regime or the opposition. These areas have become a focal struggling point between several groups, opening the doors to severe security threats, leading to no less than 29 terrorist attacks between 2012 and 2015 resulting in 205 deaths and 1,796 injuries.

Summary of attacks in Lebanon post-Syrian conflict

Date	Area	Target	Method	Death	Injured
Oct 19, 2012	Achrafieh, West Beirut	Wissam Al Hassan, head of the intelligence branch of the ISF	Massive car bomb	8	128
July 9, 2013	Beir el-Abed, South Beirut	Popular street associated with Hezbollah	Car bomb	0	50
Aug 15, 2013	Roueiss, South Beirut	Hezbollah stronghold	Car bomb	27	300
Aug 23, 2013	Tripoli	Two mosques	Two car bombs	42	400
Nov 19, 2013	Suburb, South Beirut	Iranian Cultural Center	Car bomb and explosive motorcycle	22	146
Dec 3, 2013	Beirut	Hassan Lakkis, senior Hezbollah commander	Assassination by two gunmen	1	0
Dec 27, 2013	Downtown, Beirut	Former Minister Mohamad Chatah	Car bomb	6	70
Jan 2, 2014	Haret Hreik, South Beirut	Hezbollah Political Office	Car bomb	4	77
Jan 16, 2014	Hermel	Bustling neighborhood	Car bomb	5	42
Jan 21, 2014	Haret Hreik, South Beirut	Bustling street	Suicide bomber	4	46
Feb 1, 2014	Hermel	Petrol station	Car bomb	4	23
Feb 3, 2014	South Beirut	Van	Suicide bomber	0	2
Feb 19, 2014	Suburb, South Beirut	Iranian Cultural Center	Two car bombs	8	128
Feb 22, 2014	Hermel	Army Post	Car bomb	5	17
March 29, 2014	Arsal	Army soldiers	Car bomb	3	4
June 20, 2014	Dahr Al Baidar	Police checkpoint	Suicide bomber	1	32
June 24, 2014	Beirut	Military checkpoint	Car bomb	0	12
June 27, 2014	Beirut	Hotel	Suicide bomber	0	11
Aug 6, 2014	Tripoli	Army checkpoint	Homemade bomb	1	10
Sept 19, 2014	Arsal	Army	Bomb	2	3
Sept 20, 2014	Eastern Borders of Lebanon	Hezbollah checkpoint	Bomb	2	0
Nov 14, 2014	Arsal	Army	Bomb	0	3
Dec 3, 2014	Arsal	Army	Bomb	1	2
Jan 10, 2015	Tripoli	Café	Suicide bomber	9	30
Jan 26, 2015	Zagharta	Ghassan Ajaji, ISF intelligence officer	Gunman	1	0
March 2, 2015	North Lebanon	Bader Eid, brother of Alawite leader Ali Eid	Gunman	1	0
Nov 5, 2015	Arsal	Qalamoun Muslim Scholars Committee	Motorcycle bomb	5	15
Nov 6, 2015	Arsal	Army	Improvised explosive device	0	5
Nov 12, 2015	Bourj el-Barajmeh, South Beirut	Hezbollah stronghold	Two suicide bombers	43	240
				205	1796

Figure 12. Summary of attacks in Lebanon post-Syrian conflict. Source: Global Terrorism Database

According to Jean Fahed, chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council, in 2011 DSL accounted for 18% of Lebanon's prison population, increasing to 27% in 2016, further encumbering the Lebanese judicial system and increasing the burden on Lebanese courts. Simultaneously, the rate of Syrian nationals awaiting trial increased from 34% in 2011 to 52% in 2016. In 2017, Syrians held on terrorism charges accounted for 46% of prisoners accused of perpetrating terrorist acts²³.




Figure 13. Share of Syrian detained population in Lebanon

3.3 DSL Impact

3.3-1. DSL Socio-Demographic Characteristics

The displaced Syrians in Lebanon are disseminated over the entire territory, with a major concentration in Beirut/Mount Lebanon (27%) and Bekaa (35%).

²³ <https://en.annahar.com/article/842279-syrian-refugees-make-one-third-of-lebanons-prison-population>

Genders are almost equally represented, with 52% females and 48% males. More than half of DSL (54%) are below 18 years old²⁴.




Figure 14. DSL repartition by age group and gender. Source: UNHCR




Figure 15. Map of registered DSL per district. Source: UNHCR

²⁴ Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon - VASyR 2018

Share of Registered DSL per Region (%) (2018)




Figure 16. Share of registered DSL per region.

Households Profile

Over the years, the average DSL household size has gradually declined from 7.7 persons in 2013 to 5.3 in 2015, stabilizing at 4.9 members in 2017 and 2018. Households are composed of 2.2 adults between the ages of 18 and 65, 1.6 children between the ages of 6 and 17, and 1.1 children aged five or less²⁵, which means that over half of the displaced Syrians are children.

In comparison, and according to a 2012 CAS report²⁶, Lebanese household size is 4 members composed of 2 adults and 2 children (aged between 0 and 17 years old). DSL population is growing faster than its host country population and will eventually outreach it.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Population and Housing in Lebanon




Figure 17. Share of households by size (number of members per household) - Source: VASyR 2018

As shown in the figure below, the number of Lebanese births is decreasing over the years (-1.5% CAGR 2015-2017), while non-Lebanese deliveries (mainly Syrians) is in contrast increasing (+19% CAGR 2015-2017).




Figure 18. Total deliveries for Lebanese and non-Lebanese. Source: MoPH

Considering DSL households with children, 58% had children under five years old, with a vast majority that was born in Lebanon (76%).

Knowing that 79% of DSL births did not fully complete the registration process, there is nearly 230 thousand stateless DSL. This is the most important point to be addressed in the near future, as these stateless DSL will settle in the country where they were born, deeply modifying an already fragile social, political and religious equilibrium.

Stateless DSL calculation assumptions

- (a) Number of Syrians in Lebanon: 2.1Mn
- (b) DSL Household size: 4.9
- (c) Number of households: 448,980 (a/b)
- (d) Percentage of household having children under 5 years: 58%
- (e) Number of children under 5 years per household: 1.1
- (f) Percentage of unregistered births: 79%

Results

$$(c)*(d)*(e)*(f) = 448,980*0.58*1.1*0.79 = 226,295$$

Age Distribution

In 2018, the DSL population was distributed as follows: 54% below 18 years of age, 44% between the ages of 18 and 59 and 3% above the age of 60 represented. At the regions level, Bekaa had the lowest number of DSL between the ages of 18 and 59 (41%), while Beirut and Mount Lebanon had the highest (46%). There is a noticeable gender gap for the 20-29 age group, with the share of females (60%) remaining higher than that of males. One of the possible reasons for this is that males in this age group are of military age and were consequently conscripted into the army. Other possible explanations include relocating abroad or the probable unwillingness of males in this age group to disclose their presence²⁷.

²⁷ Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon - VASyR 2018

Legal Status

The legal residency cost being relatively high (US\$ 200 per year), 73% of the DSL legally obligated to hold one (aged 15 years old and above) cannot afford to apply for a permit or renew their existing one. In March 2017 the General Security Office (GSO) issued a waiver that relieved the DSL registered with UNHCR before January 1, 2015 and who have not renewed their residency under any other category from these fees. In practice, however, the DSL still face difficulties in submitting their applications to the GSO due to the limited capacity of the centers, and differences in the application of the fee waiver amongst the GSO centers across the country. At the April 2017 Brussels Conference, the Government of Lebanon committed to ensuring that procedures for renewal of residency permits for DSL would be predictable and evenly applied.

Another reason why the impact of the waiver may have not been evident is because the waiver does not apply to all DSL, with less than 50% being eligible to benefit from the waiver.

Households with all Members Holding Legal Residency
(%) (2014-2018)




Figure 19. Share of households with all members holding legal residency. Source: VASyR 2018

Households with all Members Holding a Legal Residency by Governorate (%) (2017-2018)




Figure 20. Share of households with all members holding a legal residency by Governorate. Source: VASyR 2018

The share of households having at least one member holding a legal residency in 2018 was 39%, decreasing from 45% in the preceding year.

Households with at Least One Member Holding a Legal Residency by Governorate (%) (2017-2018)




Figure 21. Share of households with at least one member holding a legal residency by Governorate. Source: VASyR

2018

Births Registration

76% of DSL children were born in Lebanon, but only 21% of them had their birth fully registered in 2018. Although that was an improvement compared to the 17% figure in 2017, it remains a very low number, planting the seeds of a major socio-demographic change in the Lebanese population.

In order to register the birth of a child born in Lebanon, a displaced Syrian must complete the following four steps:



In addition to the above steps, DSL are requested to certify the birth certificate with the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and notify the Syrian Embassy of the birth in order to transfer records of birth to the civil registry in Syria.

Recently, the Directorate General of Personal Status at the Ministry of Interior and Municipalities adopted two measures to simplify birth registration of Syrian children²⁸:

- Since September 2017, Syrian parents no longer need to have a legal residency status to register the birth of their children with the Foreigners' Registry.

²⁸ Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon - VASyR 2018

Additionally, only one spouse, instead of both, needs to have a legal residency status to register a marriage celebrated in Lebanon in the Foreigners' Registry (Memorandum 43/02 of 12 September 2017).

- Typically, the birth of a child born in Lebanon must be registered in the Noufous department within one year or the parents would have to go otherwise to court to register the birth. Since March 2018, this one-year deadline has been ruled out for Syrian children born between January 1st, 2011 and February 8, 2018, but it remains effective for those born outside of this period (Memorandum 19/2 of March 3rd, 2018).

As a result, birth registrations slightly improved since 2017, with nearly all families having obtained a notification of birth from the doctor or midwife (97% in 2018 versus 95% in 2017) and 82% receiving a certificate from the Mukhtar versus 78% in 2017. In addition, there was an increase in the number of DSL parents registering the birth of their children with the Mukhtar, the Noufous, the Foreigners' Registry, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when compared to 2017²⁹.

²⁹ Ibid.

Level of Documentation of DSL Children Born in Lebanon (%) (2017-2018)




Figure 22. Level of documentation of DSL children born in Lebanon. Source: VASyR 2018

Income and Expenditures

68% of the DSL households have at least one working member, but only 25% of the employed DSL have a regular work. On average, employed individuals work 14 days per month, mainly in the construction and agricultural sectors. The average household income per capita is US\$ 60 per month, or US\$ 294 per household³⁰.

DSL Household Income per Capita (US\$) (2017-2018)




Figure 23. DSL household income per capita. Source: VASyR 2018

³⁰ Ibid.

The World Food Programme (WFP) remains the prime source of income for DSL households (26%) followed by informal credit (money borrowed from sources other than financial institutions, such as friends, family, traders...) and construction (16% each)³¹.




Figure 24. Main income source of DSL households. Source: VASyR 2018

The WFP (and UNHCR) are thus the main cash actors, aiding the most vulnerable DSL. Between 2017 and 2018, nearly 200 thousand of the most vulnerable DSL were reached with regular basic assistance through cash-based interventions (cash for winter, cash for food, multi-purpose cash, children-focused grants). Assistance provided by the WFP through a common cash card continued to make up the largest share of regular cash assistance to DSL.

³¹ Ibid.

Meanwhile, the WFP provided support to the displaced Syrians by implementing three modalities of food and basic needs assistance through an e-card³²:

- Food e-card assistance (US\$ 27 per month per family member) redeemable at any of the 500 WFP-contracted shops.
- Cash for Food e-card assistance (US\$ 27 per month per family member), redeemable either at any of the 500 WFP-contracted shops or withdrawn from ATMs.
- Multi-Purpose Cash e-card (US\$ 175 per month per household) for essential needs, redeemable only from ATMs.

In 2018, the WFP aided 653,000 DSL using the three modalities while UNHCR provided assistance to 800,000 through cash modalities³³.

On the expenditure side, the monthly average expenditure per capita stood at US\$ 111 in 2018. Over half (51%) of DSL households had expenditures below the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) of US\$ 2.90 per person per day, unable to meet survival needs of food, health and shelter³⁴.

Nearly 90% of the DSL households contracted debt, meaning that they lack enough resources to cover their primary needs.

The household expenditure composition is mainly made of food (40%), rent (20%) and health (12%).

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.




Figure 25. DSL households' expenditure composition. Source: VASyR 2018

Share of DSL Households Living Below SMEB - MEB (%) (2015-2018)




Figure 26. Share of households living below SMEB-MEB. Source: VASyR 2018




Figure 27. Percentage of households below the SMEB per Governorate. Source: VASyR 2018

MEB and SMEB

According to the UNHCR, the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) is an indicator of the cost of the food and non-food items needed by a DSL household of five members over a one-month period. Both assume the same non-food items and a minimum caloric intake of 2,100, but the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) is calculated with fewer nutrients, lower rent expenses, less water consumption, and an element of debt repayment. Also, the SMEB does not include health and education costs, while the MEB does.

SMEB per capita per month = US\$ 87

MEB per capita per month = US\$ between US\$ 87 and US\$ 113

Debt increased by US\$ 97 per household per year in 2018 compared to 2017, reaching an average total amount of US\$ 1,016 for households, and US\$ 250 per capita. The highest average debt amount was recorded in Beirut and Mount Lebanon at US\$ 1,342

and US\$ 1,175 respectively, twice as high as the lowest value, found in Akkar (US\$ 610)³⁵.

Main reasons for borrowing money are to buy food (82%), pay the rent (53%), healthcare bill (35%) and medication (28%).




Figure 28. Main reasons for borrowing money. Source: VASyR 2018

Food Support Coverage

The UNHCR classifies DSL food security status into four categories:

- Food secure: Able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical coping strategies.
- Marginally food insecure: Has minimally adequate food consumption without engaging in irreversible coping strategies; unable to afford essential non-food expenditures.
- Moderately food insecure: Has significant food consumption gaps, or able to meet minimum food needs only with irreversible coping strategies.

³⁵ Ibid.

- Severely food insecure: Has extreme food consumption gaps or has extreme loss of productive assets that will lead to food consumption gaps or worse.

Although food security has considerably improved in 2018 vs. 2017, more than 30% of the DSL are moderately to severely food insecure.




Figure 29. DSL food security trends. Source: VASyR 2018




Figure 30. Percentage of households with moderate and severe food insecurity. Source: VASyR 2018

Almost half (46%) of registered DSL households reported having a WFP food e-card with which they could buy food.

Shelter

There are 3 identified types of shelters where DSL reside:

- Residential (Apartment/ single room)
- Non-Residential (warehouse, worksite, farm, factory...)
- Informal settlements (tents)

Most of the DSL live in residential buildings (66%), followed by informal settlements (19%) and non-residential (15%)³⁶.




Figure 31. Type of shelters occupied by DSL. Source: VASyR 2018

A vast majority of the DSL (89%) have a verbal agreement with their landlord, with the remainder being split between written agreement (6%) and no agreement (5%)³⁷.

³⁶ Ibid.

The average monthly rent is estimated at US\$ 182, with a high of US\$ 358 in Beirut and a low of US\$ 80 in Baalbek.




Figure 32. Average rent by Governorate. Source: VASyR 2018

3.3-2. Economic Impact

The Lebanese economy entered recession since 2011 and is still not seeing the light at the end of the tunnel 8 years later. The dismissal of the National Unity Government in early 2011 and the political deadlock and instability that followed started the recession.

Despite the birth of a new Government in June 2011, the economy's downturn has been further aggravated by the Syrian unrest, due to the close political and economic bonds between the two countries. A vicious circle was triggered: severe political conflicts between pro and anti-Syrian regime surfaced in Lebanon, paralyzing the action of the successive governments, which in turn negatively impacted the local and international confidence in the country.

³⁷ Ibid.

As a result, Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) drastically decreased. Another aggravating factor was the closure of the Syrian Jordanian borders in 2015, a major crossing point for Lebanese exports.

In addition, the sudden influx of DSL has necessitated an escalation of government expenditure, due to the increased utilization of subsidized services like health, energy and education. This has led to a 12% spike in government spending between 2011 and 2012.




Figure 33. Government of Lebanon yearly spending. Source: SESRIC

According to the World Bank estimates, the Syrian crisis, including the DSL influx, has cost Lebanon US\$ 2.6 billion per year³⁸ between 2012 and 2014 (US\$ 1.5 billion cut in revenue collection and US\$ 1.1 billion additional expenses to cope for supplementary public services demand).

³⁸ Lebanon: Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict

Implications on the Lebanese Labor Market

The first observable implication is a sudden and massive workforce growth in the Lebanese labor market, which got inflated by 384 thousand workers³⁹ (+31%) between 2011 and 2016. The overwhelming majority of that workforce is unskilled or semi-skilled, and largely benefited Lebanese businesses. Indeed, business owners blithely replaced Lebanese workers, finding a way to reduce their costs thanks to Syrian workers accepting up to 65% lower wages, working longer hours while evading NSSF⁴⁰ registrations.

As of 2018, only 2,000 Syrian workers were registered with the Ministry of Labor (in comparison with 21 thousand Egyptian workers), which represents 1% of the active DSL labor force and brings their level of informality to 99%.

Historically, Syrian migrant workers were always active in the agricultural, construction and cleaning/ sanitation sectors. But the DSL started to get hired in new sectors (commerce, industry and services), helped by the workforce oversupply combined with the Lebanese business owners' behavior described above. A non-negligible number of displaced Syrians are also informally self-employed (owners of mini-markets, coffee shops on the roadsides, fruit and vegetables carts...) thus competing with their Lebanese counterparts without any legal authorization and generating unfair competition.

As a result, in 2015 the Ministry of Labor agreed with the UNHCR⁴¹ to grant the DSL work permits in the traditional sectors, under the condition that they would no longer

³⁹ Lebanon Crisis Response Plan – 2017-2020

⁴⁰ National Social Security Fund

⁴¹ <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/58207>

be eligible to receive assistance. Considering the high levels of informality and poverty among the DSL, this agreement is a drop in the ocean since the DSL would rather keep both sources of income (aid and informal work).

According to the VASyR 2018 report, 27% of the displaced Syrians were employed in construction, followed by agriculture at 24%, cleaning at 7%, and concierge at 3%.




Figure 34. Distribution of DSL employment by sector and gender. Source: VASyR 2018

The DSL labor force – considering those that are currently employed and those seeking employment, between the ages of 15 and 64 – represented 73% of working-age men and 16% of working-age women of the total Syrians within the country.

Data regarding professional qualifications is scarce. The only estimate of the skill ranges for DSL is found in the ILO’s 2013 study, which determined that 45% of Syrians were considered unskilled workers doing mainly manual tasks. 43% were semi-skilled laborers who performed crafts such as carpentry and metal work. The remaining 12% filled skilled labor positions in sectors such as education and trade. The South had the lowest

uptake of skilled Syrian workers while Tripoli had the most. The largest proportion of unskilled workers was found in the Bekaa, representing 50% of the working labor force.




Figure 35. Distribution of DSL workers by skills and gender. Source: ILO

In 2014, the World Bank⁴² estimated that if the number of DSL reached 1.6 million, an additional 220,000-324,000 Lebanese would become jobless, mainly among the unskilled youth. Furthermore, an additional 170,000 Lebanese would fall below the poverty line, adding to the already existing 1 million poor.

Our interviews with key actors in the UNHCR program and MoSA have also revealed that some national and international NGOs like SPARK, World Vision and AFD are giving vocational trainings, providing specific skills like coding to young DSL. This kind of training will eventually put more young skilled Lebanese at risk of unemployment. MoSA made it clear that strict measures are being taken towards NGOs giving similar trainings.

⁴² Lebanon – Economic and Social Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict

Health Care

The crisis increased the demand for public health services by 40%, therefore compromising access to healthcare for the poorest Lebanese patients (85% of DSL reside in poor Lebanese areas), and putting pressure on the public healthcare infrastructure, which was already suffering from lack of resources.

Primary Healthcare (PHC) is a network of 1,219 facilities⁴³ available to all DSL, whether registered or not with UNHCR:

- 208 Primary Healthcare Centres (PHCC) – governed by the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH)
- 220 Social Development Centres (SDC) – governed by the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA)
- 791 dispensaries – mostly clinics offered and managed by NGOs

These facilities include services such as:

- Vaccination
- Medication for acute and chronic conditions
- Reproductive health care
- Non-communicable disease care
- Sexual and reproductive health care
- Malnutrition screening and management
- Mental health care
- Dental care

⁴³ Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020

- Basic laboratory and diagnostics
- Health promotion

Typically, PHCs offer the most complete package of services, while dispensaries have more restricted services.

Half of DSL households (49%) benefited from discounted/subsidized PHC assistance available at 135 facilities.

Subsidized Health Care Facilities
(Count) (2018)




Figure 36. Subsidized healthcare facilities. Source: LCRP 2018

20% of DSL households did not benefit from any PHC assistance and they pay in full for any care required. Only 7% are receiving totally free PHC services, with the highest share in the South (16%) and the lowest in the Bekaa (2%).

Types of PHC assistance by Governorate (%) (2018)




Figure 37. Types of PHC assistance by Governorate. Source: VASyR 2018

In an important number of subsidized facilities, routine vaccination, acute and chronic medications as well as reproductive commodities are available free of charge. These are supplied through MoPH with the support of partners to address increased needs at PHC level.

In hard to reach, remote areas, specific primary healthcare services are made available to the DSL through one of the 25 Mobile Medical Units (MMU) operated by NGOs. MMUs provide free consultations and medication and refer the patients back to the PHCs when needed. In 2017 alone, MMUs have provided more than 200 thousand consultations.

As for hospital care, and just like PHCs, the 50 hospitals network is accessible to both registered and unregistered DSL.

These hospitals are either public or private, and contracted by UNHCR. Subsidized care is limited to obstetric (nearly 60% of admissions covered by UNHCR are related to

pregnancy) and life-threatening conditions, which have been prioritized in light of available funding, and currently covers 75% of hospitalization fees. Coverage is increased to 90% for severely vulnerable households, but also for patients with acute burns and psychiatric conditions, as well as infants in need of neonatal and pediatric intensive care. Survivors of gender-based violence, particularly survivors of rape are fully covered⁴⁴.

Although the remaining 10 to 25 % is to be covered by displaced Syrians, they often cannot afford to pay the difference. As a result, only 27% of the DSL received assistance as a financial contribution from UNHCR. 2% of the DSL didn't need any assistance for hospitalization, as they had medical insurance.

82,894 referrals were financially supported by UNHCR in 2017 for an amount of US\$ 53 million.




Figure 38. Reasons for referrals. Source: UNHCR 2017

⁴⁴Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020

The inability of some DSL to cover their whole hospitalization bill, despite UNHCR and other NGOs financial support, put a strain on public hospitals (which are obliged by law to accept any patient) resulting in a considerable financial loss of US\$ 70 million per year.

Education

Similarly to the healthcare sector, the crisis has put a major stress on the Lebanese education system, especially the public schools, having to manage more than 590 thousand DSL school-aged children (3-18 years old), out of which 36%⁴⁵ enrolled in the education system, doubling the number of students.

Share of Lebanese and non-Lebanese Students in Public Schools
(%) (2011-2017)




Figure 39. Share of Lebanese and non-Lebanese students in public schools. Source: Brussels Conference Education Report (April 2017)

⁴⁵ Source: Interview with MEHE

2018-2019 Formal Education Enrollment Figures of Non-Lebanese (AM + PM)

The **4.8 % increase** of **Lebanese** Students in Basic Public Schools compared to **2.34%** in 2017-2018 forced MEHE to shift the enrollment of Non-Lebanese students in the morning shift to the **second shift** public schools.



=> **92%** of the Non-Lebanese children enrolled in public schools **compulsory education** Grade 1 to Grade 9 are within the relevant age: **6 - 14**.

Figure 40. 2018-2019 Formal education enrollment figures of non-Lebanese. Source: RACE II fact sheet - MEHE

The Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) has responded by consistently scaling up access to formal education for all DSL children in each school year since the onset of the crisis, gradually enabling second shifts in 346⁴⁶ schools. This led to an increase in the number of teachers by more than 13 thousand, for a cost of US\$ 25 Mn to cover their wages during the sole 2018-2019 scholar year⁴⁷.

This massive influx also resulted in 66% of public schools in need of renovation due to damaged equipment and a shortage in water and sanitation structures.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ <http://www.racepmlebanon.com/index.php/scholastic-year/scholastic-year-2018-2019/expenditures-2018-2019>

Knowing that the average annual cost of public primary education is US\$ 1,500⁴⁸ per student, and the cost of public secondary education is US\$ 3,000⁴⁹ per student, the education sector needs US\$ 350 Mn per year to cope for DSL children⁵⁰.




Figure 41. MEHE expenditures. Source: Lebanon Public Expenditure Review - World Bank 2017

Energy

The electricity sector in Lebanon has always experienced a weak supply vs. demand. The inefficiency of the existing system is caused by (1) insufficient production capacity, (2) poor maintenance, (3) degraded facilities, (4) high financial losses due to fuel cost subsidies, and (5) the need to strengthen the transmission and distribution networks.

In 2010, 40% of the generated power was lost (15% by technical losses, 20% by non-technical losses, and 5% by uncollected bills)⁵¹.

⁴⁸ Source: OECD, Education at a glance 2015

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Source: Interview with MEHE

⁵¹ Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020

In 2012, *Électricité du Liban* (EDL) was only able to cover 62% of the national demand, with a peak supply of 2,019 megawatts (MW). As of 2015, the country's seven power plants are barely able to produce 1,700 MW, whereas demand reached 2,800 MW on average.

Several projects increasing electricity supply have been initiated since 2010. By the end of 2017, the Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) and EDL have provided an additional 715 MW in energy supply capacity through the following projects:

- The addition of stand-by capacity through rented power barges, providing an additional 380 MW.
- The establishment of two new power plants in Zouk and Jiyeh (annexed to the existing plants), adding 272 MW to the national grid.
- The upgrading and rehabilitation of the Deir Ammar and Zahrani power plants, resulting in additional capacity of 63 MW.

Added Capacity Since 2010 (MW)




Figure 42. Added MW capacity since 2010. Source: MoEW and EDL

To date, EDL has a theoretical 2,720 MW of installed capacity (not necessarily generated due to various deficiencies) available at peak supply, which is almost 80% of the current peak demand of 3,400 MW.

Taking into account network inefficiency, a study conducted jointly by the MoEW and UNDP⁵² revealed that an additional 486 MW of power supply are needed to cover the 383 MW additional demand generated by the DSL influx, which is equivalent to 25% of the overall national production.




Figure 43. Power consumption of DSL. Source: MoEW and UNDP

At least 45%⁵³ of the electrical connections of DSL households to the grid are done in an illegal manner, causing technical damage to the grid and increasing maintenance and reparation costs, resulting in additional losses to the electricity sector. This leads to reduced supply quality and quantity and lost economic opportunities for the Lebanese population (due to higher bills resulting from an increased power generators supply).

⁵² The Impact of the Syrian Crisis on the Lebanese Power Sector and Priority Recommendations

⁵³ Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020

It is also important to understand that energy has an impact among all sectors, and the aggravated situation of electricity supply has negatively impacted the following social and security problems⁵⁴:

- a. In addition to their uncovered operation and maintenance costs, the expenses of the Water Establishments (WE) have greatly increased due to their reliance on diesel generators to operate pumps at water sources to meet the required water demand. Furthermore, the electricity cuts lead to insufficient treatment of wastewater, causing a threat to public health and to the environment.
- b. The lack of electricity results in dark roads and contributes to security-related problems. Municipalities are forced to prioritize renewable energy for streetlights to reduce robberies and other security issues.
- c. Healthcare institutions are forced to rely more on private generators due to the insufficient supply hours and the poor quality of the supplied electricity.
- d. The electricity bills of public schools have doubled since the crisis, as they provide double shifts to ensure education for displaced Syrian children.
- e. Due to the inadequate electricity supply, Lebanese enterprises are facing increased costs, disruption of production, and reduction of profitability, resulting

⁵⁴ Ibid.

in a major obstacle to the business environment and loss of economic opportunities.

- f. The environmental cost of the additional reliance on diesel generation has not been calculated but should also be considered. It is important to assess the indirect costs of using fuel for household heating and transportation, and their impact on greenhouse gas emissions.

Knowing that in 2016, the average production cost was USC 13.5/kWh (USC/kWh), and that fees were collected at a subsidized rate of 8.97 USC/kWh (equally from Lebanese and others), the cost of providing an additional 486 MW is estimated at US\$ 313 Mn, causing an estimated deficit of US\$ 222 Mn per year.

The economic cost of providing around 486 MW of additional power at 8.97 USC/kWh is also borne by the Lebanese, who pay for private generation at a unit rate of 14.5 USC/kWh, or around US\$ 292 Mn in 2016, resulting in US\$ 111 Mn losses incurred by Lebanese consumers.

Therefore, the overall losses on Lebanon's energy sector resulting from the DSL is US\$ 333 Mn per year.

Water and Wastewater

Preceded by decades of under-investment and civil war, Lebanon's water and wastewater service systems were already in a situation of acute disorder well before the Syrian crisis.

Surface water resources were already largely exploited, groundwater resources were stressed mainly through private wells while over 50% of networks were past their useful life⁵⁵.

The agriculture sector is a particularly important stressor, as it accounts for 61% of total demand and is marked by outdated practices and inefficient systems⁵⁶.

Efforts to improve this situation by reducing system losses, to more efficiently meet the demands of the Lebanese population, have been eclipsed by the DSL arrival, which has increased Lebanon's population by 50%.

In 2014, the water consumption of displaced Syrian based on shelter type, was estimated to range between 64 and 104 liters⁵⁷ per day per registered DSL, increasing domestic water demand by 12%. Comparatively, according to a joint UNDP-MOEW report⁵⁸, water consumption of the Lebanese population is estimated at 160-180 liters per day per capita.

Main water sources used by the DSL are the public water network (30%), wells (24%) and public reservoirs (22%)⁵⁹. Unsurprisingly, water quality deteriorated at a faster pace (rivers being used as lavatories by DSL living by the riverbanks, polluting the water and causing numerous diseases) and further depleted already stressed water resources supply.

⁵⁵ Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Survey conducted for UNHCR by Solidarités International

⁵⁸ Lebanon Environmental Assessment of the Syrian Conflict & Priority Interventions - MOE/EU/UNDP, 2014

⁵⁹ Ibid.

Tests on the bacteriological quality of water that have been performed by Solidarités International showed high levels of contamination (ten times higher than the WHO guideline values for some chemicals), which is of particular concerns for pregnant and lactating women and for children under the age of five.⁶⁰

Previously absent diseases, like Leishmaniasis, were reported among DSL communities and transmitted to close Lebanese communities⁶¹.

The pre-crisis level of service for wastewater management was poor as well: only 8% of all water consumed was treated before reaching the environment, which is well below the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regional average of 32%. Only 3% of all Lebanon's sewage receives secondary (biological) treatment before finding its way into the local environment, including groundwater, streams and the coastline⁶².

Despite WASH (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene) awareness efforts related to diseases and negative environmental impact mitigation, 61% of the DSL residing in informal settlements still rely on trucked water that is unregulated and often from illegal sources, while the rest meet their needs from unsafe wells or illegal network tapping⁶³.

Wastewater is collected in informal settlements primarily in holding tanks and cesspits which require frequent desludging and trucking to the very limited facilities that can process it. Most of this will not be treated, adding to the health and environment risks in

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020

⁶³ Ibid.

the country. 71 % of people in informal settlements require regular desludging, which has a yearly cost of US\$ 8.6 Mn⁶⁴.

Total financial impact has been estimated at US\$ 586 Mn per year:

- US\$ 247 Mn for additional water demand.
- US\$ 180 Mn for infrastructure maintenance and renovation as a result of additional utilization.
- US\$ 143 Mn for alternative water sources used by the Lebanese population.
- \$8.6Mn for Desludging.

DSL Financial Impact on Water and Wastewater
(US\$ Millions) (2017)




Figure 44. DSL financial impact on water and wastewater. Sources: LCRP 2017-2020 / World Bank

⁶⁴ Ibid.

4 Survey Conducted by the UNHCR

The following survey, "A longing to go home in safety and dignity" has been conducted by the UNHCR in 2017 in the purpose of assessing DSL's intentions to return to their homeland, and although some areas in Syria came to a relative peace, understanding the reasons behind why they are still in their host country. The survey has been reproduced here under, keeping its original text.

4.1 Survey Methodology

Consultations were held with some 1,200 DSL of diverse profiles, through 34 initiatives implemented between February and November 2017. Both quantitative and qualitative data on return intentions and perceptions have been gathered through these initiatives. The first comprised a return intention survey with a random sample of 385 DSL, carried out in February 2017. This survey sought to establish an overview of the intentions and perceptions of displaced Syrian in Lebanon in regard to their future and identify the main factors that influence their decision on longer-term solutions.

In order to learn in greater detail about the factors influencing DSL's decisions, 32 focus group discussions were convened between March and November 2017, and semi-structured interviews held in July 2017 with DSL who had previously participated in the February return intention survey. The latter exercise was a way to measure the evolution of DSL's mind-sets since the beginning of the year and gather more qualitative data. Between April and May 2017, UNHCR also conducted a survey among another 385 DSL on housing, land and property issues, in view of the importance that the displaced Syrians give to this topic when considering their prospects for return.

The following questions have been asked:

1. Would you consider returning to Syria?
2. Would you consider going back to Syria within the next 6 months?
3. Why do you not consider going back to Syria in the near future?
4. When you consider going to Syria?
5. If you were to return to Syria, with whom would you return?
6. To which area are you most likely to return?

Along with the answers to the above questions, two determinant factors were assessed:

(1) the level of DSL's properties destruction in Syria and (2) the level of missing proof of property ownership.

4.2 Survey Results and Analysis

Would you consider returning to Syria?

The overwhelming majority of the DSL (89%) want to ultimately return to Syria. Families with children and older persons were particularly inclined to describe return to Syria as their preferred durable solution. Older persons tended to express a desire to spend the remaining years of life in their home country.




Figure 45. Answer to question 1. Sources: *A longing to go home in safety and dignity* (UNHCR)

Would you consider going back to Syria within the next 6 months?

The question of return was not a matter of “if”, but mostly a matter of “when”. Given the many challenges faced by people in Syria (e.g. security and safety, destroyed property, lack of services), most of the DSL who expressed a wish to ultimately return did not consider this to be possible in the near future.




Figure 46. Answer to question 2. Sources: *A longing to go home in safety and dignity* (UNHCR)

Only 2% of the DSL who participated in the February 2017 survey considered returning to Syria in the near future. These DSL reported having difficulties to cover their basic needs in Lebanon, a perception of improved security in their place of origin, a lack of resettlement prospect to travel to a third country, and a wish to be reunited with their family in Syria. They were, however, uncertain about their ability to re-establish their life in Syria and only half of them thought that such a return would be durable.

Why do you not consider going back to Syria in the near future?

The 86% who indicated that they did not consider returning to Syria within the next six months explained their decision by the volatile security situation (40%), the lack of shelter for reasons such as destroyed, damaged, or occupied property (20%), or the lack of livelihood opportunities (12%).

Why do you not consider going back to Syria in the near future?
(%) (February 2017)




Figure 47. Answer to question 3. Sources: *A longing to go home in safety and dignity* (UNHCR)

When would you consider returning to Syria?

In light of the expected challenges that returnees would be facing in the short term in their area of origin, the majority of the respondents (85%) who had mentioned that they would ultimately like to return to Syria were unsure of when they would be ready to consider return. Notwithstanding their intentions in the short term, most of the interviewed DSL expressed an intent to return to Syria one day.




Figure 48. Answer to question 4. Sources: *A longing to go home in safety and dignity* (UNHCR)

If you were to return to Syria, with whom would you return?

If they had the choice, almost all (94%) of the DSL participating in the February 2017 survey indicated that they had the intention of returning with their entire family at once. Maintaining one's family unity is a crucial aspect of being able to return.

If you were to return to Syria, with whom would you return?
(%) (February 2017)




Figure 49. Answer to question 5. Sources: *A longing to go home in safety and dignity* (UNHCR)

However, female participants often mentioned during the discussions that women and children would likely return first, as the men feared being conscripted and would remain in Lebanon for the time being to earn an income for the family.

To which area are you most likely to return?

The February 2017 survey showed that, if conditions allowed, the preferred destination of return for the majority of DSL (66%) would be their place of origin. The largest governorates of origin of the displaced Syrians in Lebanon are Aleppo and Homs. During some of the consultations, DSL expressed that returnees would be more likely to engage in rehabilitation and reconstruction if they returned to their place of origin.




Figure 50. Answer to question 6. Sources: *A longing to go home in safety and dignity* (UNHCR)

When the DSL intending to return to their place of origin in Syria (i.e. 66% of the respondents) were asked what they would do if this was not possible, 74% of the respondents indicated that staying in Lebanon would be the most likely scenario until return became possible.

4.3 Main Obstacles Preventing DSL to Return

Security Situation in Syria

The lack of predictable and sustainable safety and security in Syria was raised as the primary factor influencing DSL's plans. This was described as a major concern, due both to indiscriminate violence and to targeted protection threats.

The unpredictable security situation makes it difficult for most of the DSL to assess when they will be able to return in safety. DSL are afraid of what will happen to them if they return. Mines and booby-traps in areas of return, as well as the remaining presence of large amounts of weapons were mentioned as serious obstacles for return to Syria.

Concerns related to rape and sexual harassment of women in Syria were also raised

during focus group discussions. Throughout all the consultations, risks related to military recruitment for men in Syria were strongly emphasized by DSL.

Military service: Mobilization and punishment for draft evasion

The fear of being mobilized to take part in the conflict in Syria, or to be punished for having evaded the military draft, plays a key role in the decision of DSL families to remain in Lebanon for the time being. Men, women and youth agreed during the various consultations that men of drafting age, between 18 and 42 years, youth approaching recruitment age, as well as those who were wanted in Syria for desertion or draft evasion, would not go back for fear of being mobilized. Men returning from abroad are reported to be consistently checked for their military service records. DSL having fled the war and violence are worried to have to go back to it.

Issues relating to housing, land and property

Displaced Syrians face numerous, complex challenges relating to their housing, land and property (HLP) situation in Syria.

Research and HLP-specific surveys conducted by UNHCR in 2016 and 2017 show that these include insecurity of tenure, lack of documentation, extensive property damage and secondary occupation. In addition, an outdated and incomplete land administration system, coupled with a regulatory framework encompassing over 130, sometimes inconsistent, HLP-related laws that include over 30 new laws enacted since 2011, is likely to further complicate the situation for DSL and returnees seeking their HLP rights.

DSL clearly emphasized that the lack of housing or shelter upon return is a major obstacle to it. Some indicated that their property has been destroyed or damaged, while

others indicated that their property is reportedly occupied without their consent or seized by the authorities in the area. Single female heads of household and widows may face difficulties in recovering their property, as it usually is in the name of their husband.




Figure 51. State of DSL property in Syria. Sources: A longing to go home in safety and dignity (UNHCR)

An additional problem for DSL in terms of HLP rights is that many do not have any, or any legally valid, documentary evidence of their property ownership, or even civil documents such as identity cards or marriage or death certificates that are also critical to confirm ownership. For HLP documents registered in the Land Register in Syria, a copy might be found through a search of existing records. However, the pre-conflict Land Register was paper-based and non-centralized, and not all properties can be tracked in records.

5 Conclusion and Recommendations

It is true that without the help of the international community, which is strongly (although not sufficiently) supporting the Lebanese Government by providing substantial humanitarian and financial assistance, the Syrians crisis impact would have been far worse than it is now.

However, it should be mentioned that if any country in the world had to face the same situation, it would have been structurally disaggregated, despite any assistance.

Throughout its history, Lebanon has been confronted to so many existential threats, that resiliency is carved in its DNA.

But resiliency - like anything else - has its limits, and they cannot be stretched forever.

Lebanon, as an entity, is at a vital crossing with challenges on many fronts:

- Holding the highest displaced population per capita
- Hindered by the third highest debt-to-GDP ratios in the world
- Having a sluggish economy and an uncompetitive labor market
- Growing poverty among the Lebanese (30% are under the poverty line and more than 10% live in extreme poverty)
- Persistent water and energy deficiencies
- Overstrained health and education capacities
- Baring the consequences of regional and local political turmoil
- Suffering from negative credibility perception vis-a-vis the international community (Lebanon is ranked 138 out of 175 countries in term of corruption)
- Impeded with no foreseen return of the displaced Syrians to their homeland

- Threatened in the long term by stateless DSL presence

Most of the Syrian territory is now pacified, and although there are still some ongoing skirmishes, they are limited to specific areas of the country. The DSL, under the protection of the United Nations, must be temporarily resettled within the pacified regions which are out of the Syrian government control, as it is their right to return to their homeland.

For that purpose, we have identified a 50,000 square kilometers area (~19,000 square miles – 5 times bigger than Lebanon) controlled by the Kurdish forces, fairly irrigated by many rivers and lakes (mainly the Euphrates) and lightly populated.




Figure 52: Safe zone for DSL resettlement in Syria




Figure 53: Who controls what in Syria - Sources: Liveuamap; Aljazeera

However, let's not hide behind the argument that all the problems will be solved when the DSL will be back to their homeland. Problems will be alleviated, that is a fact, but Lebanon needs more than relying on (and waiting for) the international community to act.

Gaps have been identified across the sectors and are being regularly monitored. Some of these gaps could be directly addressed by GoL, allowing the current financial and economic burden to be curbed, while meeting the Lebanese citizens' expectations and improving their livelihood:

(i) *Stateless DSL*: Knowing that 97% of the babies obtain a certificate from the hospitals where they were born, there could be a one-stop-shop capacity at the hospital premises, ensuring that the birth registration process, from the Mukhtar certificate to the Ministry of Foreign affairs stamp, is automatically completed. In parallel, partial births registrations should be identified and treated accordingly.

(ii) *Energy*⁶⁵:

- Replacement of existing sodium street lighting bulbs with solar powered energy saving bulbs (such as LED lighting)
- Distributing energy-saving light bulbs to the displaced Syrians to reduce their power consumption
- Installation of solar-powered water pumps (for irrigation and domestic use)
- Installation of solar water heater systems in households of vulnerable Lebanese and displaced Syrians
- Installation of large-scale photovoltaic plants across Lebanon (i.e. Beirut River Solar Snake)
- Installation of smart meters, allowing theft reduction, remote monitoring and better network management (ongoing project)
- Reinforcement of EDL's distribution and transmission networks, to reduce technical losses
- Implementation of Distributed Energy Resources (DER), which are decentralized electricity-producing solutions (solar, wind or hybrid) meant to meet local needs, while reducing technical losses

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(iii) *Water and Wastewater:*

- Replacement of the fixed paid yearly subscription by smart water meters, to incentivize water consumption reduction and limit violations
- Fully implement (and update) the 2010 National Water Sector Strategy by enabling the needed human and financial resources
- Activate existing wastewater treatment plants by connecting them to the sewer network and provide the Water Establishment the needed resources to operate and maintain them (estimated at US\$ 300 Mn. Per year). This would enable 75% of the water to be treated, up from 8% currently

(iv) *Labor market:*

1. A reform of the labor market law should be undertaken. Similarly to the Emiratisation laws, “Lebanisation” laws should be enacted whereby foreign nationals can be employed only where there are no qualified Lebanese nationals to undertake the role
2. Due to the high level of poverty rate among the Lebanese, “Lebanisation” should be applied even in the three categories where the Syrians are usually allowed to work (construction, agriculture and sanitation)
3. A maximum quota of foreign workers should be applied (ratio would vary depending on the type of industry)

4. Reinforce the human and financial capacities of the MoL to allow the proper laws enforcement

(v) *Education sector impact on the labor market:* There is a demand vs. supply

mismatch in the Lebanese labor market, and this is due to two major factors:

1. The Lebanese economy is weak (2% GDP yearly growth rate since 2011), thus not creating enough jobs (5,000 per year) to absorb the new entrants (32,000 per year)
2. There is a discrepancy at the skills level; with its current curricula, the education system is not properly answering the labor market requirements.

As a result, there are 45 thousand vacancies waiting to be filled (30 thousand in the tourism and 15 thousand in the industry sectors).

MEHE, MoL, private companies and all labor market stakeholders should put in place a proper strategy to answer this gap

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